The Kinked Demand Model and the Stability of Cooperation by Sergio Currarini & Marco Marini
 
WP-EMS
Working Papers Series in
Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
“The Kinked Demand Model and  
the Stability of Cooperation” 
• Sergio Currarini, (U. Venice) 
• Marco A. Marini, (U. Urbino) 
 
 
WP-EMS # 2009/05 
ISSN 1974-4110 The Kinked Demand Model and
the Stability of Cooperation
Sergio Currarini and Marco A. Marini
Abstract. This paper revisits a particular behaviour for ￿rms compet-
ing in imperfect competitive markets, underlying the well known model
of kinked demand curve. We show that under some symmetry and regu-
larity conditions, this asymmetric behaviour of ￿rms sustains monopoly
pricing, and possesses therefore some "rationality" interpretation. We
also show that such a behaviour can be generalized and interpreted as
a norm of behaviour that sustains e¢ cient outcomes in a more general
class of symmetric games.
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1. Introduction
This paper focusses on the postulated behaviour of ￿rms competing in
imperfect competitive markets, ￿rstly theorized in the late 30s by a num-
ber of well known economists (Robinson (1933), Sweezy (1939)), and best
known as the "kinked demand model". This basically predicts an asym-
metric behaviour of ￿rms in response to a price change, each expecting its
rivals to be more reactive in matching its price cuts than its price increases.
This prediction has been empirically tested by Hall and Hitch (1939) and
later by Bhaskar et al. (1991), extensively criticized as not grounded in
rational behaviour by Stigler (1947), Domberger (1979), Reid (1981) and
more recently extended to dynamic settings by Marschak and Selten (1978),
Bhaskar (1988), Anderson (1984), Maskin and Tirole (1988), among the
others.
In this paper we add to this debate by showing that this behavioural rule
possesses strong stability properties and, therefore, facilitates ￿rms￿collu-
sion. In particular, in a symmetric and monotone market, we prove that, if
every ￿rm adopts and expects a simple kinked-demand norm of behaviour
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(KD), the symmetric strategy pro￿le sustaining the collusive outcome (i.e.
monopoly pricing) constitutes an equilibrium. We show that this result
is rather robust and can be extended to all n-person symmetric strategic
form games: a KD norm of behaviour always makes the symmetric e¢ cient
strategy pro￿le (the one maximizing the sum of all players￿utility) stable.
Moreover, we show that under some additional standard assumptions on
players￿playo⁄ functions, a slightly stronger norm of behaviour (implicitly
implying a norm of reciprocity) makes the e¢ cient outcome the only stable
outcome of the game.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sketches the paper
idea in a classical two-￿rm kinked demand model. Section 2 introduces a
more general game-theoretic setting. Section 3 presents the main paper
results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Kinked Demand Model
The original idea of the kinked demand model (Robinson 1936, Sweezy
1939) is based on the assumption that ￿rms competing in a common market
would react to changes in rivals￿prices in an asymmetric manner. Specif-
ically, when a ￿rm rises its price it expects the other ￿rms to rise their
price comparatively less (under-reaction); when a ￿rm lowers its price, con-
versely, it expects the others to reduce even more their price (over-reaction).
This expected behaviour generates a perceived demand with a "kink" at the
original price levels (see ￿gure 1).
Figure 1
The main insight of this note can be illustrated by means of a simple
case of two ￿rms competing in prices in a common imperfectly competitive
market with di⁄erentiated goods Suppose prices are set at collusive levels
(p￿
1;p￿
2), i.e., in order to maximize the sum of ￿rms￿pro￿ts. The kinked
demand model assumes that the following behaviour (here expressed as a
reaction function ki(pj) for every i = 1;2, j 6= i), would prevail in case ofKINKED DEMAND & COOPERATION 3

















Note that no presumption of best response (rationality) is assumed for kj(:).
The main point of this paper is that if ￿rms adopt and expect the above
behavior, then deviation from collusive prices (p￿
1;p￿
2) are prevented, and
collusion is a stable outcome. To see this, suppose one ￿rm, say ￿rm 1,
decides to deviate from the pair of strategies (p￿
1;p￿
2) to improve upon its









2). It is well known that under
price competition the e⁄ect of a rise in competitors￿prices yields a positive
e⁄ect on every ￿rm￿ s pro￿t, i.e. @￿i


































































contradicting the e¢ ciency (for the ￿rms) of the perfectly collusive outcome.
The same result obviously holds when it is ￿rm 2 to deviate. This implies
that if all ￿rms expect a kinked demand response from all other ￿rms, no
pro￿table deviations are possible from the perfectly collusive outcome (mo-
nopoly pricing).
Interestingly, the result extends to the case in which the ￿rms set quan-
tities instead of prices. The ￿ kinked demand￿behavior now dictates the



















i indicates any feasible quantity di⁄erent from q￿
i , and kj(q
0
i) the
quantity set in response by its rival. Again, it is well known that under
quantity competition the e⁄ect of a rise in the competitor￿ s quantity yields
a negative e⁄ect on every ￿rm￿ s pro￿t (negative spillovers), that is, @￿i
@qj ￿ 0,
since it lowers the market price p(q1;q2). Hence, if ￿rm 1 pro￿tably deviates
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which, again, contradicts the e¢ ciency of the pair of strategies (q￿
1;q￿
2). In
the next section we show that such a result holds in the general class of
symmetric strategic games.
3. A More General Setting
The result sketched above does not rely on the speci￿c structure of im-
perfect competition, but only on the asymmetry of the assumed reaction to
changes in players strategies, and on some built-in symmetry. The aim of
this section is therefore to give a precise statement of the result in a larger
class of games that still preserves the required symmetry and monotonicity.
In this class of games players are endowed with the same strategy space
and perceive symmetrically all strategy pro￿les of the game. Moreover,
players￿payo⁄s possess a monotonicity property with respect to their oppo-
nents￿choices. Although speci￿c, this setting still covers many well known
economic applications (as Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly, public goods
games and many others).





, in which N = f1;:::;i;:::;ng is the ￿nite set of
players, Xi is player i￿ s strategy set and ui : X1 ￿ ::: ￿ Xn ! R+ is player
i￿ s payo⁄ function. We assume that each strategy set is partially ordered by
the relation ￿. We assume the following.
P.1 (Symmetry) Xi = X for each i 2 N. Moreover, for every i 2 N
and any arrangement of the strategy indexes,
(3.1) ui(xi;x￿i) = u2(x2;x1;::;xn) = ::: = un(xn;x2;::;x1):
P.2 (Monotone Spillovers) For every i;j 2 N with j 6= i, and every
x1
j ￿ xj ￿ x2
j we have either "positive spillovers" (PS)
(3.2) ui(x￿j;x1
j) ￿ ui(x￿j;xj) ￿ ui(x￿j;x2
j);
or "negative spillovers" (NS)
(3.3) ui(x￿j;x1
j) ￿ ui(x￿j;xj) ￿ ui(x￿j;x2
j);
where x￿j = (x1;:::;xj￿1;xj+1;::;xn):
A strategy pro￿le x is symmetric if it prescribes the same strategy to
all players. A Pareto Optimum (PO) for G is a strategy pro￿le xo such
that there exists no alternative pro￿le which is preferred by all players and
is strictly preferred by at least one player. A Pareto E¢ cient (PE) pro￿le
is a pro￿le xe that maximizes the sum of payo⁄s of all players in N.KINKED DEMAND & COOPERATION 5
Let us now introduce the notion of a generic social norm of behaviour
in our setting.1
Definition 1. (Social norm of behaviour). We say that the social norm
of behaviour ￿ : X 7! Xn￿1 is active in G if every player i 2 N deviating
from a given pro￿le of strategies x 2 XN by means of the alternative strategy
x0
i 2 X￿ { such that x0
i 6= xi, expects the response ￿Nnfig(x0
i) from all players
j 2 Nnfig.
Finally, let us introduce a general de￿nition of stability of a strategy
pro￿le in our game G; under any arbitrary social norm of behaviour.
Definition 2. A strategy pro￿le x 2 XN is stable under the social norm
￿ if there exists no i 2 N and x0




We are interested in the family of Kinked Social Norm (KSN) of behav-
iour (KSN), de￿ned as follows:
Definition 3. (Kinked Social Norm) A Kinked norm of behaviour k


















Note that, according to the de￿nition above, every KSN imposes to
all agents in Nnfig to play a strategy lower (greater) or equal than the
strategy played by the deviating player i under positive (negative) spillovers.
Pictures 2 and 3 below represent graphically the KSN in the two-player case
under either positive (￿gure 2) and negative spillovers (￿gure 3). In both
pictures, the darker (brighter) area represents the KSN for player 1 (player
2) under either positive or negative spillovers. The pair (xe
1;xe
2) represents
the symmetric PE strategy pro￿les in the two cases.
1The emergence of norms of behaviour can be viewed as arising from the evolution of
shared expectations into prescriptions and then into norms of behaviour (see, for instance,
Lewis 1969, Bicchieri, 1990 and Castelfranchi et a1., 2002). Once established within an
organization, e.g..a ￿rm, a set of norms ends up to represent its corporate culture (see, for
instance, Brown (1995)).6 SERGIO CURRARINI AND MARCO A. MARINI
Figure 2
Figure 3
Note that behind the KSN of behaviour there is no presumption of ratio-
nal behaviour and players￿reactions may not correspond to their best reply
mappings (see below for a brief digression on this point).
We are now ready to present the main results of the paper.KINKED DEMAND & COOPERATION 7
Proposition 1. Let conditions P1-P2 hold on G. Then, under the
Kinked Social Norm of behaviour(KSN), all symmetric Pareto e¢ cient strat-
egy pro￿les of G are stable.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Proposition 1 simply tells us that if the expected behaviour of players
in the event of a deviation from an e¢ cient strategy pro￿le is described by
the kinked social norm, then every such e¢ cient pro￿le, if reached, is stable.
In terms of imperfect competition, the expected kinked behaviour of ￿rms
makes collusion a stable outcome.
The example below makes clear that stable ine¢ cient (and asymmetric)
outcomes cannot be ruled out without adding more structure to the above
analysis.
Example 1. (2-player symmetric and positive spillovers game)
A B C
A 4,4 2,3 1,2
B 3,2 2,2 1,2
C 2,1 2,1 1,1
In this game we assume that players￿strategy can be ordered and, e.g.,
A ￿ B ￿ C, therefore the game respects both P.1 and P.2, with positive
spillovers (PS). In this game, (A;A); the PE strategy pro￿le, is obviously
stable under any KSN. If, say player 1 deviates playing B, KSN implies
k2(B) = fB;Cg and player 1 ends up with a lower payo⁄ than before, since
u1 (A;A) > u1 (B;B) > u1 (B;C). By symmetry, the same happens to
player 2. However, also ine¢ cient strategy pro￿les can be stable under a
KSN rule. For instance (B;B) i stable if the KSN active in the game pre-
scribes that players react with C to any feasible deviation. Also, it can
be checked that (A;B), (C;A) and (A;C) are also stable under any KSN,
given that u1 (B;A) > u1 (A;B) > u1 (A;C) and u1 (C;A) > u1 (B;B) >
u1 (B;C) and the same for player 2.
To strengthen the result of proposition 1 and rule out ine¢ cient stable
outcomes, we add the following assumptions on the structure of G.
P3. Each player￿ s strategy set is a compact and convex subset of the set
of real numbers.
P4. Each player i￿ s payo⁄ function ui(x) is continuous in x and strictly
quasiconcave in xi.
Under these additional conditions, Lemma 1 in the appendix shows that
there is a unique Pareto E¢ cient strategy pro￿le of G, and it is symmetric.
In order to rule out all ine¢ cient stable outcomes, we need to re￿ne the so-
cial norm employed in proposition 1. Intuitively, the kinked norm imposes
an upper bound on the pro￿tability of deviations, and was therefore useful
to show that e¢ cient pro￿les are stable. In order to rule out the stability8 SERGIO CURRARINI AND MARCO A. MARINI
of ine¢ cient pro￿les, we need to impose a lower bound on the pro￿tability
of deviations. We do so by imposing a "symmetric" social norm of behav-
iour, which essentially prescribes players to mimic the strategy adopted by
a deviator.
Definition 4. (Symmetric Social Norm) The Symmetric Social Norm









We are now ready to prove the next proposition.
Proposition 2. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, under
the Symmetric Social Norm of Behaviour the (symmetric) Pareto e¢ cient
pro￿le xe 2 XN is the unique stable strategy pro￿le.
Proof. See Appendix. ￿
Finally, a relevant question to raise is whether the behaviour predicted by
the model of kinked demand can in general be considered rational. About
this issue, it has been proved for other purposes (see Currarini & Marini
(2004)), that in all symmetric supermodular games in which strategy sets
are ordered, in the event of any coalitional deviation from the e¢ cient sym-
metric outcome, remaining players always play a lower strategy (under PS)
or a greater strategy (under NS) than every deviating coalition. This proves
that the behaviour postulated by the kinked demand model is in principle
fully compatible with players￿rationality whenever their actions are strate-
gic complements (see, for instance, Bulow et al. (1985)) and players￿best
response are positively sloped. The same cannot be said when games are
submodular, i.e. players￿actions are strategic substitutes, and their best
response are negatively sloped.
4. Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have shown that, in all symmetric and monotone strate-
gic form games, the behaviour postulated by the classical model of kinked de-
mand possesses strong stability properties. Such a result holds even stronger
when players expect a symmetric behaviour from all remaining players in
the event of a deviation. In this case, the perfectly cooperative (collusive)
outcome becomes the only stable outcome of the game.
5. Appendix
PROPOSITION 1. Let conditions P1-P2 hold on G. Then, under
the Kinked Social Norm of behaviour(KSN), all symmetric Pareto e¢ cient
strategy pro￿les of G are stable.
Proof. We know by de￿nition 1 that KSN implies xj ￿ x
0
i for all xj 2
kNnfig(x
0
i) under positive spillovers (PS) and xj ￿ x
0
i for all xj 2 kNnfig(x
0
i)
under negative spillovers (NS). Assume ￿rst positive spillovers (PS) on GKINKED DEMAND & COOPERATION 9
and suppose that the symmetric e¢ cient pro￿le (PE) xe 2 XN is not stable
and there exists a i 2 N and a x
0






Using PS and the fact that kj(x
0
i) ￿ x0






















which contradicts the e¢ ciency of xe.
Assume now that under negative spillovers (NS) there exists a player
i 2 N with a x
0






By NS and the fact that kj(x
0
i) ￿ x0










which, again, leads to a contradiction. ￿
LEMMA 1. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then, there is
a unique strategy pro￿le xe = argmaxx2XN
P
i2N ui(x) and it is such that,
xe
1 = xe
2 = ::: = xe
n.
Proof. Compactness of each Xi implies compactness of XN: Continuity
of each player￿ s payo⁄ ui(x) on x implies the continuity of the social payo⁄
function uN =
P
i2N ui(x). Existence of an e¢ cient pro￿le (PE) xe 2 XN




j for some i;j 2 N: By symmetry we can derive from xe



















Since, by the convexity of X; the strategy vector (￿x0 + (1 ￿ ￿)xe) 2 XN;
we obtain a contradiction. Finally, by the strict quasiconcavity of both
individual and social payo⁄s in each player￿ s strategy, the e¢ cient pro￿le xe
can be easily proved to be unique. ￿10 SERGIO CURRARINI AND MARCO A. MARINI
PROPOSITION 2. Let the game G satisfy conditions P1-P4. Then,
under the Symmetric Social Norm of Behaviour (SSN), the set of stable
strategy pro￿le of G only contains the (symmetric) Pareto e¢ cient pro￿le
xe 2 XN.
Proof. Consider ￿rst the e¢ cient pro￿le xe, which, by Lemma 1, must
be symmetric. Suppose player i has a pro￿table deviation x0
i. Using the Sym-
metric Social Norm (SSN), the expected payo⁄ for i would be ui(x0
i;:::;x0
i).
By symmetry, this same payo⁄ level would be obtained by all other players









which contradicts the e¢ ciency of xe. We next show that all ine¢ cient
pro￿les are not stable. The argument for ine¢ cient symmetric pro￿les is
trivial: thanks to the Symmetric Social Norm (SSN) , it is enough for any
player i to switch to the e¢ cient pro￿le to improve upon any ine¢ cient
strategy pro￿le. Consider then an asymmetric pro￿le x0. Let i be one player
such that ui(x0) < ui(xe) (obviously, such a player must exist by e¢ ciency
of xe and ine¢ ciency of x0). By continuity of payo⁄s, there exists some
strategy ￿ xi close enough to xe
i such that
ui(xe) ￿ ui(￿ xi;:::; ￿ xi) < ui(xe) ￿ ui(x0):
Since the pro￿le (￿ xi;:::; ￿ xi) can be induced by player i thanks to SSN, player
i has a pro￿table deviation, and the result follows. ￿
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